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THREATS AND PREEMPTIVE
PRACTICES
Claire Finkelstein*
University of California1 Berkeley

I. INTRODUCTION

Sometimes it is morally permissible to prevent someone from performing
a wrongful act by harming him before he has a chance to act. It is permis
sible, for example, to kill someone you reasonably fear is about to kill you.
Under other circumstances, however, it may only be permissible to threaten
to harm someone to discourage him from performing a wrongful act. It is
not always permissible straightaway to harm him. A military commander, for
example, may threaten an enen1y with disproportionate retaliation, even
though it would not ordinarily be permissible to carry it out.
The first sort of situation involves the infliction of harm to prevent a
wrongful act, that is, to make it impossible for that act to occur. The second
involves the use of a threat of harm to preempt the wrongful act, that is, to
dissuade, rather than to prevent, its occurrence.! I shall accordingly call
practices organized around the first sort of act preventive practices, and
practices organized around the second sort preemptive.
Preemptive practices have a curious structure. Let us take the following
features as definitional of such practices. First, the infliction of harm is not
what we might call "independently" justifiable on legitimate preventive
grounds-that is, it is not justifiable in and of itself to prevent the occur
rence of the wrongful act. Second, the wrongfulness of the act nevertheless
justifies issuing a threat to inflict the relevant harm. Third, there are cases in
which once the threat has failed to deter the wrongful conduct, the pre
viously prohibited infliction of harm may become permissible. For example,
it may be permissible for the military commander to follow through with
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1. I am aware that we sometimes speak of a person as "prevented" from doing something
when he is threatened with some harm should he choose to do it, and that we also speak of a
person as "preempted" if he is physically impeded from doing something. It will be convenient,
however, to have separate terms for each situation, and so I have chosen to use them as
indicated above.
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his threat to attack if his enemy remains undeterred. This third feature of
preemptive practices raises an interesting problem: Might an otherwise
impermissible act become permissible because it is performed pursuant to
a threat it was justifiable to issue?
Examples of preemptive practices abound in ordinary morality. They

•

arise not only in military exploits but also in personal relationships.2 Such
practices, however, are particularly important in the law, most notably in the
criminal law. Consider, for example, the police practice of using deadly
force against a suspect fleeing from the commission of a felony. Under the
common law version of the practice, an official or citizen was permitted to
use deadly force against any suspected felon who failed to obey a command
to stop, provided that the suspect had been warned of the intention to use
force in the event of noncompliance.3 The version of the right endorsed by
the United States Supreme Court is more limited. It is restricted to law-en
forcement officers who have probable cause to believe the suspect .poses a
risk of harm to others. 4 But the structure of the practice is preemptive
under either version. First, the actual use of deadly force against a suspect
cannot be justified on independent grounds as a legitimate preventive
measure, for it is excessive to kill a person presumed innocent to prevent
him from fleeing. Second, it is nevertheless legitimate for an officer to

threaten to use deadly force in order to dissuade a suspect from fleeing.
Third, it seems acceptable in at least some cases for the officer to follow
through on his threat to use force should the suspect disregard his warn
ings. It looks, then, as though this is a practice in which the use of deadly
force is rendered permissible where it otherwise would not be by the prior
issuance of a legitimate threat to use it.
Alternatively, consider the rule allowing the use of force to recapture
stolen property or to effectuate reentry upon land. A common formulation
of the rule is that a person wishing to use force for these purposes must first
issue a request that the property be returned or the land vacated. In effect,
he must threaten harm before he may inflict it. 5 Arguably, the use of force
under these circumstances would be excessive as an independent preven
tive act before the property is stolen. Does the issuance of the threat justify
the use of force in this case when it would not otherwise be justifiable to use
it? Stretching the framework a bit, one might also understand the right of
homeowners to use deadly force in defense of habitation along the same
lines. A plausible explanation for the defense is that equipping homeown..

2. In what follows I focus on practices where the infliction of harm involves the use of
violence against another person. But there are nonviolent preemptive practices as well. For
example, it might be permissible for a parent to deprive a child of some good in furtherance
of a prior threat it was legitimate to issue, when it would not be legitimate for the parent to
inflict that same deprivation in the absence of the previously issued threat.
3. Seejoshua Dressler, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw§ 21.03 [8] [2] [a] [i] (1995).
4. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).
5. Model Penal Code§ 3.06(3) (a).
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ers with this right constitutes an implicit threat against potential intruders.
The actual use of force, however, outstrips the preventive justification one
would ordinarily offer for it. For if the intruder poses no risk of physical
harm, the use of deadly force should not be legitimate by way of prevention,
and if the intruder does pose a risk of such harm, the use of force can be
justified on self-defense grounds, making a separate rule regarding defense
of habitation unnecessary.6
There is, however, a way of accounting for these practices that does
not assign this strange justificatory efficacy to the issuance of a threat.
Suppose, for example, that more suspects were apprehended under a
rule that allows the police to resort to the use of deadly force than under
a rule that only allows them to threaten, but not to follow through on,
a failed threat. 7 Where this is the case, it is tempting to explain the
preemptive practice in collective terms, namely as a way of discouraging
similar wrongful acts by other agents. The use of force would then be
justifiable in the aggregate, even if it could not be justified against any
particular wrongdoer. Under an aggregative rationale, the practices I am
calling "preemptive" would be just another species of preventive practice.
The difference between a preventive practice like self-defense and a prac
tice like that involving the use of deadly force against fleeing suspects
would thus lie in the fact that in the former the use of force could be
justified in each particular case, whereas in the latter the justification for
the use of force would make reference to the more systemic benefits the
practice as a whole engenders.
But while the turn to aggregative justification is a natural one to make, I
do not think we ought to accept it. For such a justification seems to
presuppose the legitimacy of using a person to serve as an example for
others, without needing to justify the treatment of that person on its own
terms. It would sanction shooting a suspect, for example, merely as a way of
deterring future suspects from flight, rather than because it was justifiable
to do so in his case. In a liberal regime, concern with individual rights leads
to an insistence on a justification for the infliction of violence that is
individualized, namely that justifies the use of violence on a case-by-case
basis. If we accept this limitation on the form of justification required to
legitimate violent practices, our question about preemptive practices is
squarely posed: Can acts of violence in a practice involving the issuance of
deterrent threats meet the requirement of individualized justification, when

6. Sometimes the preemptive nature of the practice is made explicit, as when a homeowner
is obligated to warn potential intruders of the presence of a protective device.
7. The majority in Tennessee v. Gamer dismissed this as a ground for retaining the common
law rule, saying that there was little evidence that appreciably greater numbers of felons were
apprehended under it. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 10-1 1 . But it seems likely that this
provided at least part of the historical rationale for the rule, whether adequately empirically
supported or not.
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there is no independent justification that would vindicate such acts as valuable
in their own right?
In what follows, I shall explore one way of supplying an affirmative
answer to this question. The solution to the problem of deterrent threats
I shall explore exploits a parallel between the problem of the justifiability
of deterrent threats and that of their rationality. I shall thus hope to
draw on reflections about the rationality of deterrent threats to suggest
a possible account of their justifiability. As we shall see, one prominent
theory of the rationality of assurances, that introduced by David Gauthier,
suggests at least the outlines of an answer to the rationality of threats. A
problem with exploiting this suggestion, however, is that there appears
to be an asymmetry between assurances and threats that may make the
account of the rationality of the former inapplicable to the latter. The
central task of this article is to explore that asymmetr y. In particular, I
shall propose a way of understanding deterrent threats that makes Gauth
ier's account of the rationality of assurances applicable to them. The ac
count of threats I present will not appeal to someone who rejects
Gauthier's account of assurances. That is a drawback, in light of the fact
that the latter is controversial. But it should prove interesting to see how
at least one prominent theory of the rationality of assurances can ulti
mately provide a way of thinking about the justifiability of legal practices
involving the use of deterrent threats. In addition, if I am correct that

the rationality of assurances and the rationality of threats must be taken
together, this would have important implications for Gauthier's recent
thoughts about the relation between assurances .and threats. My argument
that threats can be assimilated to assurances on Gauthier's account should
thus be of interest apart from its application to the problen1 of justifying
preemptive practices.

II. THE JUSTIFIABILITY OF DETERRENT THREATS
As we have seen, preemptive practices raise the question of whether it is
possible to justify an act otherwise unjustifiable by the fact that it constitutes
the execution of a failed deterrent threat it was legitimate to issue. Many
authors have rejected the possibility of an account with such a structure in
the context of nuclear deterrence. Their central claim is that it is not
legitimate to threaten to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for another's
nuclear attack, because it could never be legitimate actually to use them. 8
This follows from a principle they call the Wrongful Intentions Principle

(WIP), which says it is wrong to form the intention to do something it would
be wrong actually to do.9 Because a deterrent threat is a species of intention,
8. See, e.g., Michael Dummett, The Morality ofDeterrence, 22 CAN. J. PHIL 111 ( 1986).
9. The principle was first explicitly formulated by Gregory Kavka. See Gregory Kavka,
Paradoxes ofDeterrence, 75 J. PHIL 285 ( 1978).

Some
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adherents of WIP would argue that a threat could never justify an act
otherwise unjustifiable. For it is only permissible to threaten those acts it
would be permissible on independent grounds to perform anyway. An
adherent of WIP would accordingly reject the legitimacy of any practice of
the sort I am calling "preemptive."
In order to justify preemptive practices, then, we would have to think
about justification differently. Let us begin by considering an account that
rejects the requirement of independentjustification, such as that offered by
Larry Alexander of practices like self-defense and defense of habitation)O
Alexander argues that two rather minimal principles are adequate to ac
count for legitimate prevention in either context: the wrongful act principle,
which requires that the act sought to be prevented is wrongful, and the
notice principle, which requires that the potential wrongdoer be placed on
notice of the harm that will befall him should he perform the wrongful
act.11 He begins with a broad view of threat-issuance: Any threat of force is
legitimate to discourage the wrongful act of another. Alexander then at
tempts to move from legitimate threat-issuance to legitimate threat-execu
tion by appealing to the possibility of automatic punishment. He argues that
if it were legitimate to threaten to harm someone contemplating a wrongful
act, it would be legitimate to program a machine to inflict harm under these
same circumstances. He then claims that if it were legitimate to program a
machine to inflict harm in the event of a failed threat, it would also be
legitimate to inflict such harm "manually," as long as the agent performing
the wrongful act had been notified of the conditional intention to inflict
harm.
In a similar vein, Warren Quinn has offered an account of punishment
that also rejects the requirement of independent justification. On Quinn's
account, the right to punish follows from the right to threaten punishment
in order to deter wrongful acts of aggression. The right to threaten punish
ment, in turn, derives from the right to self-defense. Like Alexander, Quinn
accepts that the sole justification for the infliction of harm may sometimes
consist in the fact that its infliction follows from a failed de terrent threat it
is legitimate to issue. And like Alexander again, Quinn argues for the move
from legitimate threat-issuance to legitimate threat-execution by imagining
a device of automatic punishment, suggesting that if it were legitimate to
issue a deterrent threat in self-defense, it would be legitimate to program a
10. See Larry Alexander, The Doomsday Machine: Proportionality, Punishment and Prevention, 63
THE MONIST 199 (1980).
ll. ld. at 213. Curiously, these two rather weak principles turn out to be too strong for
ordinary preventive practices like self-defense. There is no reason to think, for example, that
one is under any obligation to place the attacker on notice before defending oneself against
his imminent attack. By contrast, the account is more helpful for understanding preemptive
practices like the fleeing felon rule, as the notice requirement makes more sense in this
context. Notice is at least a logical condition for the issuance of justifiable deterrent threats,
because a threat cannot be effective in the absence of clear notice of the consequences of
violating the conditions of the threat.
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device to make good on such threats. He then argues that a threat it would
be legitimate to execute automatically could be justifiably executed "manu
ally. " 1 2

Alexander and Quinn both accept that i t i s possible t o justify an act of
violence that is otherwise unjustifiable by the fact that it represents the
execution of a deterrent threat it was justifiable to issue. The sort of account
they propose thus has the right structure to explain preemptive practices.
The disadvantage of the account, however, is that without some restrictions
on the acts it is possible to justify in this way, we could bootstrap ourselves
into j ustifying any act the threat of which was issued to deter wrongful
conduct. Thus the account would justify not only the law-enforcement
practices in which we are interested, but many extreme preemptive meas
ures we would not wish to justify. As Alexander himself points out, the
account would justify a town ' s setting up a machine gun to automatically
fire on those trespassing on a courthouse lawn , as long as the use of the
machine gun were adequately publicized to pote n tial trespassers in ad
vanc e . 1 3 Let us accordingly call an account of the above sort the Extreme
Account, because of the extreme results it purports to justify.l4
What we seem to require , the n , is bootstrapping of the sort the Extreme
Account envisages, but not quite as much bootstrapping as it might allow. In
particular, there are two ways the account might be tempered. First, there
might be limitations on the threats it is legitimate to issue to deter wrongful
conduct. Issuing a threat, after all , is a form of coercion, and there are
restrictions on the legitimacy of any sort of coercio n , even when imposed
to deter wrongful conduct. I s it justifiable to threaten a child who refuses to
go to bed with a severe beating, the question of actually inflicting the
beating to one side? Arguably not. It is not clear to me, however, how one
would determine which threats are legitimate and which are not. I will thus
leave this avenue unexplored.
Second, there might be limitations on the threats it is legitimate to execute,
even assuming a broad account of the threats it is legitimate to issue. In
particular, one might wish to question the move from threat-issuance to
threat-execution via the use of an automatic retaliation device. If threat-

1 2 . Warren Quinn, The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish, in MoRALITY AND ACTION 52
( 1 993).
1 3 . Alexander, supra note 10, at 2 1 3.
14. Alexander explicitly endorses an unlimited account of threat-issuance where the threat
is issued to deter wrongful conduct. He is consistent, however, and simply accepts the extreme
results of his account. Quinn does not assume that every threat issued to deter wrongful
conduct is legitimate. For he maintains that the right to threaten punishment depends on the
right to self-defense, suggesting that he thinks there are limitations on legitimate threat-issu
ance. But the right of threat-issuance Quinn supposes will arguably still be too broad. For if the
right to threaten harm is as broad as the right to self-defense, and the right to punish is as
broad as the right to threaten, then the right to punish some instance of wrongdoing will be
as broad as the right to prevent it. But rights of prevention are broader than rights of
punishment. For example, it is permissible to kill someone to prevent him from raping you,
but death is too severe a punishment for rape.
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execution is automatic, rather than manual, the entire course of con
duct-threaten harm under certain conditions and carry it out-can be
decided upon in a single, up-front choice. Under these circumstances,
·there would be an independent justification for executing the threat after
all, namely a preventive rationale that would apply to the decision to set up
the machine in the first place. By assuming we can move from automatic to
manual threat-execution , Alexander and Quinn have arguably assumed
away the most important aspect of our problem, namely the question of
whether there is a way ofjustifying an individual act of violence when there
is no independent justification for performing it.
In seeking to develop an account of preemptive practices, then , let us
assume that no automatic device such as Alexander and Quinn use to
link threat-issuance and threat-execution is available. Let us instead as
sume that every deterrent threat must be what I shall call "deliberatively
executed," that is, the execution of a threat must take place pursuant to
a separate act of choice. In this way we can ensure that any threat justi
fiably issued is truly justifiably executed, in cases in which the threat has
failed to deter.
Let us also add a second assumption, one that will probably seem more
questionable. This assumption is that it is not possible to issue a bluffing
threat. Granted, people resort to bluffs all the time, often successfully. But
we can justify this assumption in the present context on the grounds that
threats issued as part of a large-scale social practice would be transparent
over time to their recipients. While an isolated bluff might have deterrent
efficacy, a law-enforcement practice like the one we are considering would
quickly become ineffective if the threats it employed were not sincere .
There is also a conceptual argument against bluffing threats we will con
sider when we discuss their rationality. We need no conceptual argument
here, however, given that our discussion of deterrent threats is meant to
apply to practices of the aforementioned sort.
The no-bluffs assumption crucially transforms our problem. For it links
the issuance of a threat and its execution in a way that requires us to justify
the execution of any threat whose issuance we wish to justify. We can
accordingly treat the legitimacy of executing deterrent threats as supplying
the conditions under which deterrent threats may be issued (and vice
versa) ,15 We could have reached this same result by assuming that any threat
justifiably issued must also be independently justifiable to execute, as WIP
would require. Instead, we have tied the justifiability of threat-issuance to
that of threat-execution without restricting legitimate threat-execution to
those acts that admit of independent justification.
15. For this reason, we can leave the suggestion of some authors that the justifiability of
threat-issuance and that of threat-execution admit of entirely separate analysis to one side. See,

e.g., David Lewis, Devil's Bargains and the Real World, in MACLEAN, THE SECURITY GAMBLE ( 1984).
Although the suggestion could be correct in theory, it cannot be practically engaged for the

sort of practice I have in mind.
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Having suggested parameters for a theory of the moral justifiability of
deterrent threats, I wish to turn to the problem of accounting for their
rationality. As I have suggested, there is an answer to the question of when
it is rational to issue and make good o n deterrent threats that will provide,
by way of analogy, an answer to the question of when such threats are
justifiable. While the account of the rationality of deterrent threats will be
significantly more precise and easier to apply than the account of their
morality, it will be instructive to consider whether the vindication of their
rationality provides at least a framework within which we can attempt to
solve the moral difficulties preemptive practices raise.

Ill. RATIONAL ASSURANCES, RATIONAL THREATS
Let us abstract from the moral issues by considering an example of a clearly
unjustifiable threat someone might issue . The question we will now con
sider is whether it would be rational to issue, and if need be to execute, such
a threat. Suppose Abigail wishes to deter Burt from applying for a job
Abigail herself wants to obtai n . Abigail therefore threatens to tell Burt's wife
that Burt is having an affair if Burt applies for the job. Let us suppose th-at
Abigail will succeed in deterring Burt if Abigail can make her threat cred
ible. Let us also suppose, however, that it will be costly for Abigail actually
to inform Burt's wife . 16 (Abigail herself is the person with whom Burt is
having the affair, and she has reasons of her own for wishing to keep it
secret.) The trouble, then, is that it would not be rational for Abigail to
make good on her threat if Burt ignores the threat and applies for the job
anyway. And assuming Burt knows this, Abigail cannot make her threat
credible to Burt.
The question, then, is whether Abigail can find some way of making her
threat credible. One strategy would be for her to precommit to telling Burt's
wife in the event that Burt applies for the job. For example, Abigail might
pay someone to tell Burt's spouse should Burt apply for the job. Or Abigail
might arrange matters such that Burt's applying for the job would somehow

trigger the informing of Burt's spouse . But let us now carry forward the two
assumptions we developed in discussing the justifiability of deterrent threats
to our problem here. First, let us assume that no threat can be automatically
executed. In the theory of rational choice, the point is often put by saying
that no precommitment is possible. This assumption turns out to be quite
crucial, for without it, executing the threat would be like swallowing a pill:
A person might manage, by finding the righ t pill, to make herself behave
16. I shall follow the practice of some writers of defining a threat as a conditional intention
that will be costly for the threatener to execute should the threat fail to deter. Gauthier writes
that "a threat (if sincere) must be supposed by its issuer to commit her conditionally to a
retaliatory act that would make the threatened party's life go less well than if he were not to
incur it, and her own life to go less well than if she were not to execute it." See David Gauthier,
Assure and Threaten, 104 ETHICS 690, 710 (1994).
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in a way that would best serve her interests, but this would not be sufficient
to defend the rationality of the actions performed under the pill's influ
ence. The only action whose rationality could be defended would be the act
of taking the pill in the first place. Demonstration of the rationality of a first
act that causes a second act, however, does not demonstrate the separate
rationality of the second act, even if the latter is one it is in the agent's
interest to perform.
It is worth noting that if one were to insist on the independent ration
ality of any act performed in execution of a deterrent threat (the rational
analogue of

WIP), this first assumption would make all deterrent threats

irrational to execute. Acceptance of a strict expected-utility account of
rational action, for example, would eliminate the possibility of accounting
for the rationality of issuing and making good o n deterrent threats. For
by hypothesis it will never be rational to choose to make good on a failed
deterrent threat, since doing so will be all cost and no gain. If we now
carry over the no-bluffs assumption from our previous discussion as well,
we can see that were we to require independent vindication of the ra
tionality of each act, we would also be unable to account for the rationality
of issuing any deterrent threat. For if bluffing is ruled out, then any ar
gument for the rationality of issuing a threat must also provide an argu
ment for making good on the threat should it fail to deter. And given
that it can never be rational to make good on a failed deterrent threat,
assuming no precommitment, it can never be rational to issue such a
threat either.
In the previous section we made use of a pragmatic argument for the
no-bluffs assumption. Here I wish to suggest the outlines of a conceptual
argument for it. Although there are pragmatic arguments to which we
might turn in this context as well, if the account of the rationality of
deterrent threats I shall offer is to have validity outside of its particular
application here, it will be necessary to justify the no-bluffs assumption on
nonempirical grounds. Assume that Abigail and Burt are rational, and that
each knows the other is rational. Assum e , that is, that there is common
knowledge of rationality between them. Now there is an argument for the
irrationality of issuing bluffing threats that proceeds by reductio. Suppose it

were rational for Abigail to issue a bluffing threat. Then if both Abigail and
Burt are equally rational, Burt would also know it was rational for Abigail to
issue a bluffing threat. Moreover, because there is common knowledge of
rationality, Burt knows that Abigail knows it is rational for her to issue a
bluffing threat. Under these circumstances, no threat Abigail could issue
would be credible, as Burt would suppose Abigail was bluffing. To make a
threat effective it must be credible, and to make it credible, it must be the
case that it is not rational to issue a bluffing threat, on pain of making it
rational for both parties to accept the ineffectiveness of any threat. While
the advocate of the rationality of bluffs has responses she might make , I
shall not consider these responses here. Anyone disinclined to accept it can

320

CLAIRE FINKELSTEIN

always limit my argument to cases in which the no-bluffs assumption can be
pragmatically defended.
Against the background of the above assumptions, Abigail appears to be
in a bind. For she knows she will have occasion to reconsider the rationality
of making good on her threat to inform Burt's spouse if Burt proceeds to
apply for the job. And when she reconsiders, she will realize she has nothing
to gain and something to lose by actually telling Burt's wife. She cannot
appeal to the deterrent benefits of issuing and making good on her threat
at this point, for her efforts to deter Burt will already have failed. Abigail
might think it rational to issue the threat anyway, hoping to deter Burt but
planning not to make good on the threat should it fail to deter. But Abigail
knows that it is not rational for her to issue a bluffing threat, and ·She knows
that Burt knows this. Given our two conditions, namely that Abigail must
execute any threat deliberatively and that she cannot issue a bluffing threat,
Abigail cannot regard the issuance of a deterrent threat as rational, for she
knows she will not regard the threat as rational to execute.
Let us now turn to David Gauthier's argument for the rationality of
issuing and making good on assurances. As I have suggested, that account
may give us a way of thinking about the rationality of deterrent threats. In
particular, let us consider the rationality of issuing an assurance that it
would not be rational on independent grounds to perform in order to
consider the parallel to the threats problem we have been discussing.
Consider the familiar example of the two farmers, each of whom needs
the other to help with plowing, and neither of whom expects to require the
services of the other in any future year. (Assume both are retiring from
farming with the next harvest season.) Farmer Clarence's field is ready for
plowing this week, and farmer Doreen's field will be ready next week. Is it
rational for Clarence and Doreen to enter into an agreement to plow one
another's fields? Doreen should surely conclude, if she is rational, that it
would not be in her interest to enter into such an agreement. For although
she cannot plow her field by herself, it is worse for her to help Clarence plow
his field and end up with no help next week plowing her own than for
neither farmer to help the other. Because Clarence has no reason to help
Doreen once Clarence's field is plowed, Clarence will surely fail to make
good on his promise to help Doreen. Although it would be in Clarence's
interest to convince Doreen that his promise to reciprocate is sincere, since
otherwise he will not gain the benefit of Doreen's assistance, it seems
impossible for him to offer the assurance necessary to convince Doreen to
perform first.
Here, however, is an argument for why it would be rational for Clarence to
make good on a promise to assist Doreen next week. If Clarence could find
someone who would be willing to force him to assist Doreen next week, say,
for a fee of$10, it would be rational for Clarence to spend the$10 to secure
Doreen's help now. Would it not then be rational for Clarence simply to com
mit mentally to help Doreen next week? For not only could he then secure
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Doree n ' s help in plowing his field this week, he could do so without spending
the $10 he would otherwise have to spend on precommitment. If precommit
ment is rational, then internal commitment must be all the more rational,
and Clarence and Doreen should both regard the rational solution as that
which involves Clarence 's prior sincere commitment to assist Doreen.
But what is to stop Clarence from reconsidering his intention to help
Doreen once next week rolls around? And if Clarence knows he will have a
chance to reconsider his intention, what can he tell himself to make his
commitment to helping Doreen a sincere one now? Because Clarence
cannot make use of any actual precommitment, what he needs is an argu
ment he can give himself for making good on his assurance when the time
comes to do so. That is, he needs a deliberative principle for vindicating the
rationality of performing an act which is suboptimal considered on inde
pendent grounds.
Gauthier argues in favor of just such a deliberative principle. For he
claims that there is a form of reasoning Clarence can use to reap the
benefits of precommitment without incurring its costs. The deliberative
principle can be stated in the form of a recommendation: Adopt that course
of action associated with the best outcome from among the various courses
of action available, and then settle on particular actions by determining
what executing that course of action requires. The agent who has adopted
a plan must not deliberate about what actions to perform by recalculating
the independent benefits of each action separately. This recommendation
applies, at any rate, if it continues to be the case that the agent could expect
to do better under the selected plan than under any other available plan .
He should therefore act in accordance with any plan that was rationally
adopted, as long as no change in his situation occurs that would make that
plan suboptimal. The required deliberative principle that allows us to move
from the issuance of an assurance to its performance in the absence of
precommitment, then, is a principle about the optimal form of reasoning
itself. I t advises an agent to reason in two tiers: optimize over plans, and
select actions in accordance with the plans thus adopted.
This account of the rationality of assurances seems to solve the problem
of the rationality of deterrent threats. For it suggests precisely the sort of
principle we need to move from the rationality of threat-issuance to the
rationality of threat-execution in the absence of automatic retaliation.
When Abigail attempts to deter Burt from applying for the job Abigail
covets by threatening to tell Burt's wife of the affair, Abigail adopts the plan
it is most rational for her to adopt. When the time comes to decide whether
to make good on the threat, Abigail should not deliberate about the bene
fits of informing Burt's wife in isolation. Instead, Abigail should reason
about that action by placing it in the context of the previously adopted plan.
And since the plan calls for Abigail to make good on her threat where
Abigail has failed to deter Burt by issuing it, Abigail should act as her plan
requires and tell Burt ' s wife about the affair.
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Let us skip ahead briefly to the use I wish to make of the rational choice
argument and see how the analogous account of the justifiability of deter
rent threats would go. It would be justifiable to issue and make good on a
deterrent threat when the action in fulfillment of the threat follows from a
morally justified plan taken as a whole. While it may not be justifiable to use
deadly force against those merely suspected of having committed a violent
felony on independent grounds, the entire course of conduct-threaten to
use force if the suspect continues to flee and use force in the absence of
compliance with the threat-may be justifiable. Rather than reasoning
directly about whether to execute a particular failed deterrent threat, a
moral agent should reason about the justifiability of such actions indirectly,
relativizing them to plans: If the plan of threat-issuance and threat-execu
tion produces a morally better state of affairs than would obtain without the
plan, the use of preventive force would be justified if required by the plan.
In the theory of rationality, reasoning by reference to plans rather than
individual acts is vindicated under what is sometimes called a pragmatic
theory of rationality. I? Such a theory considers how the individual reasoner
can make herself as well off as possible, measured solely in terms of possi
ble outcomes. A question for the foregoing account of the justifiability of
deterrent threats concerns the analogue of the pragmatic theory of ration
ality on the moral side: What moral theory could we use to judge the
justifiability of overall courses of action? Here I wish merely to note the
difficulty. I shall return to it briefly at the end.
I have now sketched the argument in its entirety. We must, however,
return to address a rather significant objection. I proceeded by applying an
argument for the rationality of following through on assurances to the
rationality of following through on deterrent threats. I then applied the
argument for the rationality of deterrent threats to the moral justifiability
of issuing and making good on such threats. But the first step in the
argument is highly problematic, insofar as there seems to be an asymmetry
between assurances and threats that may make the argument for the ration
ality of the former inapplicable to the latter. I shall devote most of the
remaining discussion to an exploration of this supposed asymmetry. I con
clude that there is not in fact the asymmetry between threats and assurances
there appears to be. To the extent an asymmetry exists, it is instead between
plans involving individually suboptimal actions whose payoffs are risky and
those whose payoffs are sure. This asymmetry does not differentiate the
rationality of plans involving assurances from those involving threats. As we
shall see, it divides the terrain somewhat differently. If this is correct, the
argument for the rationality of assurances we have considered will apply to
threats after all.

17. See
TIONS§

Edward F. McClennen, RATIONALITY AND DYNAMIC CHOICE: FOUNDATIONAL EXPLORA

5.2 (1990).
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IV. AN ASYMMETRY BETWEEN THREATS AND ASSURANCES?
Let us suppose it is possible to defend the rationality of performing a
suboptimal act in satisfaction of an assurance as suggested, namely by
reference to the fact that the act is part of a plan it was optimal to adopt.
The problem is that where threats are concerned, I may not be able to
reason in this way. For once my threat has failed to deter, I will regard the
plan of attempting to deter you by issuing a threat as a poor plan to have
adopted. Now I see I would have been better off never having adopted the
plan of trying to deter you in the first place , for I have gained nothing by
doing so, and the plan will now be costly to execute. An apparent difference
between threats and assurances, then, is that I will regret having adopted
the plan if I end up having to execute my threat, whereas in the case of a
plan involving an assurance I will remain pleased with the plan, even when
I must incur the cost of making good on the assurance. This seems to
suggest that unlike where assurances are concerned, it surely cannot be
rational for me to adopt a plan involving the use of a deterrent threat. For
the conditions under which I would have to execute the threat are ones
under which the plan will turn out to have been disadvatageous to adopt.
In his article Assure and Threaten, Gauthier attempts to solve this problem
by suggesting that an agent might regard herself as advantaged by a policy
of issuing and making good on threats, even if she cannot regard herself as
advantaged by any particular deterrent threat. The difference between
assurances and threats, he suggests, is that the policy does the work for
threats that a course of action does for assurances: Where threats are
concerned, an agent must optimize over policies, and then decide o n
courses of action involving deterrent threats b y reference t o t h e policy.
Thus, the argument for executing a failed threat is that issuing and execut
ing deterrent threats is part of an overall policy it is optimal to adopt, given
the deterrent benefits of maintaining such a policy. IS
Gauthier now acknowledges, however, that the appeal to policy does not
work. Briefly, the objection that troubles him the most is an argument to
the effect that it can never be rational to institute a policy of issuing and
making good on deterrent threats, and so it cannot be rational to stick to
such a policy when the policy requires the performance of a suboptimal
act.1 9 For suppose an agent issues a first threat as part of an intended policy
of issuing and making good on threats, and suppose that threat fails to yield
any deterrent benefits. She can only vindicate the rationality of making
good on the threat by appealing to possible future benefits of the policy. But
what is to guarantee that such future benefits will indeed accrue? Granted,
if she happens to find herself in the middle of such a policy she can
18. Gauthier, supra note 16.
19. This objection is set out by Joe Mintoff in an unpublished manuscript entitled Gauthier
on Intention and Action, at 15. Gauthier suggests his acceptance of the objection in another
manuscript, entitled Odysseus and the Tortoise.
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rationally continu� to issue and to execute deterrent threats, provided that
maintaining the policy is indeed optimal. But before the policy has pro
duced benefits, it cannot be rational to institute it, for one could end up
committing oneself to a series of actions that might not turn out to be
beneficial at all. Aware of this possibility from the outset, a rational agent
can never justify adopting a policy that involves issuing and making good
on deterrent threats.20 And this means that when she must choose between
performing a suboptimal act in furtherance of a policy and abandoning the
policy altogether, the latter will seem most rational.
Although this brief summary of the difficulty with the appeal to policy is
surely too abbreviated to be fully convincing, I wish to accept it as correct
in the present context. For I wish to explore instead the supposed asymme
try between threats and assurances. If it turns out that there is no relevant
asymmetry, it would not be necessary to try to make the appeal to policy
successful anyway. So let us see if we can articulate more clearly the basis for
thinking there is an asymmetry between assurances and threats.
What is the difference between assurances and threats, then, that seems
to preclude appealing to the optimality of plans involving threats but not to
plans involving assurances? One difference is that threats introduce an
element of risk or uncertainty. When Clarence assures Doreen that he will
help her plow her field next week if Doreen plows Clarence's field now,
Clarence's future performance is not implicated unless Doreen actually
assists. Thi� means that there is no risk to Clarence that following through
on the commitment to help Doreen will turn out to be disadvantageous,
relative to the baseline of what things would have been like for Clarence
had he not made the commitment. Where deterrent threats are concerned,
however, the advantages afforded by issuing the threat are not certain to
accrue. Where the threat fails, it is precisely because these advantages have
not accrued that the threat must be carried out. The rationality of commit
ting to a course of conduct involving threat-issuance and threat-execution
thus depends on the threatener's assessment of the probability that she will
not have to make good on the threat. The higher the risk of follow-through,
the less rational issuing the threat becomes.
This makes the issuance of a threat look like a lottery, where the cost of
the lottery ticket is the ex ante chance that the agent will have to make good
on the deterrent threat multiplied by the cost of doing so, and the lottery
prize is the successful deterrence of the person threatened. Whether it is
rational to enter such a lottery should be determined by balancing the value
of successful deterrence, discounted by the chances of winning that value,
against the cost to the agent of having to make good on the failed threat,
discounted by the chances of having to make good on it. Of course, if one
is less than fully certain that the action one seeks to deter will be performed
20. I pursue another objection to the appeal to policy in Rational Temptation in PREFERENCES,
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: EsSAYS IN HONOR OF DAVID GAUTHIER (Chris Morris & Arthur Rip
stein, eds., forthcoming 2000).
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without one's intervention, one should also take into account the

likelihood of the action's being performed without intervention, as well

as

the costs of this occurring. A rational deterrent threat, then, is one in which
the expected benefit of issuing the threat exceeds the expected costs asso
ciated with issuing it, assuming that a failed threat entails follow-through.
Prior to his attempt to account for the rationality of deterrent threats in
terms of policies, Gauthier presented an account built roughly around this
intuition, which he subsequently abandoned in favor of the appeal to policy.
Gauthier's early account will prove more useful for our purposes than his
later account, and let us therefore consider it in greater detail. Assume I am

x, in order to deter you from
doing something else, y. My options are to threaten to do x, and thus
commit to doing x should the threat fail to deter you from doing y, or do
something else, i. You can either perform the action I wish to deter you
from performing, namely y, or you can do something else, y'. Then, Gauth

considering issuing a threat to do something,

ier's early account says, the following condition would have to be satisfied
to make it rational for me to issue a sincere threat to do

x:

Px u(yx) is the probability, given that I threaten x, that you will do the
y anyway, multiplied by the disutility to me of your doing
it. (1-Px) u(y') is the probability, given again that I threaten x, that you are
successfully deterred from doing y, multiplied by the utility to me of your
being deterred. Px'u(yi) is the probability, given that I choose not to

undesired action

threaten

x,

of your performing the undesired action y, multiplied by the

(dis)utility to me of your doing so. Finally
given again that I choose not to threaten

(1 - Px') u(y') is the probability,
x, of your choosing to perform

y, namely y', anyway. The first expression in square
(1 - Px) u(y') ] represents my expected utility should I
sincerely threaten to do x if you do y. The second expression in square
brackets [Px'u(yi) + (1
Px') u(y') ] represents my expected utility from
some action other than

brackets

[Pxu(yx)

+

embarking on some other course of action instead. The entire inequality

indicates that it is rational to issue a deterrent threat when the expected
benefits from issuing the threat are greater than the expected costs, or, as
written, when the benefits minus the costs are greater than zero.21
2 1 . David Gauthier, Deterrence, Maximiz.atiort, and Rationality, in THE SECURI1Y GAMBLE 1 00
( 1984) . Gauthier makes the point by saying that it is rational to issue a sincere deterrent threat
when the proportionate decrease that the deterrent policy effects in the probability of facing
the other's undesired action is greater than the minimum required probability for deterrent
success. He represents this as follows:

[(Px' Px)lPx·] > P.
(Px' - Px) IPx' represents the increased chances that the other party will refrain from perform
ing the undesired act, given that one threatens him, divided by the absolute chances of
deterring him. The P on the right-hand side of the equation is the point at which the agent is
indifferent between performing the deterrent action and not performing ex ante.
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Gauthier's early account proposes an ex ante measure of when it is ra
tional to issue a sincere deterrent threat: It is rational to issue a threat when
the expected value from issuing it exceeds its expected costs. Let us call this
the ex ante solution to the rationality of deterrent threats. The ex ante
solution would clearly be the rational way to assess the merits of issuing
deterrent threats if one could precommit to following through on the
threat. For in that case the decision to threaten and the decision to follow
through are folded into a single, up-front choice, and the payoffs associated
with that choice are exhausted by the expected utility from the benefits and
costs associated with issuing the deterrent threat. The trouble is that the
account will not serve to vindicate the rationality of deterrent threats when
the execution of the threat must take place deliberatively, that is, pursuant to
a decision to execute a failed threat. For a threat may be justified by its
expected value ex ante, even when carrying out the threat ex post cannot be
justified in this way. Reflecting at the point of execution on the benefits to
me of the threat and its associated follow-through, I cannot regard the ex

ante benefits of issuing the threat as supplying any reason to execute the
threat once those advantages have failed to accrue. The problem with
Gauthier's early account, then, is that it operates entirely ex ante, and ex ante
reasoning will only justify automatic threat-execution. It cannot justify exe
cuting threats in a way that is sensitive to ongoing deliberation, particularly
where the execution of the threat must be decided on after the hoped-for
benefits from issuing the threat have failed to accrue.
How to accommodate deliberative threat-execution will become clear if
we recall how deliberative assurance-execution was accommodated in the
case of an assurance. To make the case of an assurance parallel to that of a
deterrent threat, let us consider the rationality of an assurance that also
contains an element of risk. That is, let us re-create the threats problem on
the assurance side by making the benefits frqm the assurance less than
certain to accrue. Suppose, for example, that Clarence's field is twice as
large as Doreen's field. Doreen is not willing, therefore, to offer her assis
tance to Clarence in exchange for assistance plowing her own field. She
would, however, be willing to offer Clarence a 50% chance of assistance if
Clarence would commit to helping Doreen plow her field next week. Both
parties should regard this as a fair deal.
Next, suppose Clarence flips a coin to determine whether he will receive
assistance, and he loses the gamble. Can he now apply the deliberative princi
ple from the original assurance case to vindicate the rationality of making
good on the commitment to assist Doreen? That principle, to recall, said that
an agent should perform those actions demanded by plans it was optimal to
adopt. In this case, the plan of exchanging a fair shot at Doreen's assistance
for his own labors was the optimal plan for Clarence to adopt. True, he now
wishes he had never exchanged a commitment to assist Doreen for a fair shot
at her assistance. But there is nevertheless a sense in which he has received ex
actly what he bargained for when he entered the agreement, namely a 50%
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chance of receiving Doreen's assistance. If the original deliberative argu
ment for making good on assurances is correct, then the same argument
should apply here: Act consistently with a prior optimal plan if the circum
stances are among those envisioned at the time the plan was adopted.
Consider, alternatively, the famous example of the eccentric billionaire
who promises to put a million dollars in your bank account by midnight
tonight if you form the intention to drink a toxin tomorrow. The toxin will
leave you sick for

24 hours but will have no long-lasting effects.22 The

billionaire has a nearly infallible way of telling whether you have formed the
requisite intention. The rational course is arguably to commit to drink the
toxin and then actually to drink it, because you are better off under the plan
that involves intending to drink and drinking than you would be without
the plan . Once again, the relevant deliberative principle says it is rational
to optimize over plans and to select particular actions by restricting your
reasoning to the plan it was optimal to adopt. 23
Now consider a variant on this puzzle. Suppose the billionaire presents
you with a gamble. He will use a randomizing device that will give you a
one-in-a-hundred chance of having a million dollars deposited in your bank
account tonight should you form the intention by midnight to drink the
toxin tomorrow. The toxin is milder than before: It will leave you with an
unpleasant headache for several hours but will have no other untoward
effects. You regard the trade-off of headache for the one-in-a-hundred
chance at a million dollars as worthwhile, and so you now commit to drink
the toxin tomorrow. Suppose you learn at midnight that you have lost the
gamble and that the money is not in your bank account. Arguably that
should not make the difference to whether it is rational for you to drink the
toxin tomorrow. For if it was irrelevant to the rationality of your drinking in
the original case that nothing you could do after midnight would affect
whether the money was or was not in your bank account, then it should be
equally irrelevant in the modified case. If anything made it rational for you
to drink the toxin in the original case , after all, it was not that you would be
glad immediately prior to drinking that you had adopted the plan of
committing to drink and drinking. Rather, it is that the plan of committing
yourself to drinking and then actually drinking was the optimal plan to
adopt. This fact about the plan-its optimality-remains true even if it turns
out that the consequences of having adopted the plan are not the ones for
which you had ideally hoped, assuming once again that the· circumstances
are among those you envisioned when you adopted the plan initially.
It looks, then, as though injecting an element of risk into the gains from
assurances should not fundamen tally affect the rationality of making good
on them . Following through on an assurance, whether risky or not, is ra-

22. The problem was first posed by Gregory Kavka, The Toxin Puzzle, 43 ANALYSIS 33 ( 1 983) .
23. See David Gauthier, Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation: A Critique and a Defense, 3 1
NoDs 2 0 ( 1 997) .
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tional if the plan under which the assurance was issued is the plan it was
optimal to adopt. The argument easily generalizes to threats, for there is no
relevant difference between a threat and a risky assurance. In Section VI I
will formalize this understanding of threats and risky assurances and show
more precisely how it accommodates deliberative threat-execution. What we
require first, however, is an argument for the suggestion that there are gains
in the case of a failed risky assurance or a failed threat that are comparable
to the gains from a sure assurance. The question, in other words, is whether
an ex ante increased chance of benefit is in and ofitselfa benefit.
Before turning to this question, it is worth noticing that the foregoing may
ironically provide ammunition for someone who wishes to reject Gauthier's
original claim about the rationality of making good on assurances. For if we
must accept following through on assurance "gambles" as rational if we
accept following through on sure assurances as rational, then for someone
�ho thinks the rationality of the former cannot be vindicated when assur
ances must be deliberatively executed, the rationality of suboptimal actions in
fulfillment of assurances as part of optimal plans cannot be defended after
all. But in this article I am assuming, rather than arguing for, Gauthier's
original claim about assurances. This is not because I am certain it is correct,
but rather because I wish to consider the light it sheds on the rationality, and
ultimately on the morality, of deterrent threats. I will not, therefore, attempt
to address this possible implication of my argument in the present context.

V. IS AN EX ANTE I NCREASED CHANCE OF
B E N E F I T ITSELF A B E N E FITl
Should you think of yourself as benefitted if I make you a gift of a lottery
ticket? One answer is that whether I have benefitted you depends on
whether I have bought you the winning ticket. For surely the ticket is no
benefit to you, considered in itself. An alternative view of the situation,
however, seems no less plausible. You might regard my giving y ou the ticket
as a benefit whether or not I have bought you the winning ticket. For the
ticket increases your chance of benefit, and that in itself may be a benefit.
The same problem arises where harm is concerned. Is exposing someone
to an increased risk of harm itself a harm? There is some support for the
suggestion that it is. Although in law, courts and commentators have mostly
rejected the claim that an increased risk of harm is compensable,24 some
interesting cases have gone the other way. In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. 25
,

for example, plaintiffs were compensated for damage allegedly sustained
owing to their mothers' ingestion of DES during pregnancy. The court
allowed recovery according to the amount of risk each defendant created to
24. See, e.g., Plummer v. Abbott Laboratories, 568 F. Supp. 920, at 922 (D.R.I. 1 983) ; see also
Ernest Weinrib , Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 407 ( 1 987) .
25. 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y 1 989) .
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the public from DES. The correct measure of this risk, the court said, can
be established by the principle of market-share liability introduced in Sin

dell.26 But the court also suggested that because it was interested only in the
risk of harm, market share should not be determined along causal lines, as
it had been in Sindell. Consequently, the court refused to exculpate defen
dants who were part of the market producing DES but who could prove that
they could not have caused plaintiffs injuries. As the court said:
[B] ecause liability here is based on the over-all risk produced, and not
causation in a single case, there should be no exculpation of a defendant who,
although a member of the market producing DES for pregnancy use, appears
not to have caused a particular plaintiff's injury.27

In other words, the court used market-share liability as a justification for
compensating for exposure to risk, rather than as a way of estimating each
defendant' s contribution to resultant (i.e., non-risk-based) harm.
There are also a number of decisions allowing recovery for emotional
distress where the distress was caused by the defendant' s imposition of an
unjustified risk of harm.28 Courts stress in such cases that there would be
no recovery for emotional distress in the absence of exposure to risk. And
although there is often a requirement that the plaintiff manifest symptoms
of emotional suffering, this may once again be merely a way of measuring
damages from exposure to risk. Arguably, the harm for which plaintiffs are
compensated is the exposure itself, rather than the emotional distress that
resulted.
Among commentators, the idea of compensation for risk has gained
some support in recent years. One author, for example, argues that failure
to compensate for risk in cases in which the exposure to risk is known many
years before the risk could possibly eventuate imposes a substantial hard
ship on plaintiffs.29 Another insists on a related point, namely that the duty
to pay damages should be tied to risk-creation rather than to the infliction
of injury.30 The duty to compensate should be tied to the offender's wrong26. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1 980) (assigning liability to drug manufactur
ers according to their share of market at time of plaintiff exposure to product, rather than
requiring plaintiff to demonstrate defendant's actual causal contribution) .
27. Hymouritz, 539 N.E.2d at 1 078.

28. See, e.g., Haggerty v. L&L Marine Services, Inc . , 788 F.2d 3 1 5 , 3 1 7-18 (5th Cir. 1986) ;

Dunn v. Owens Coming Fiberglass, 774 F. Supp. 929, 942 (D.V.I. 1991 ) .

29. Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Cau.ration and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 1 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 779, 785-86 ( 1985 ) .
30. Christopher H . Schroeder, Correctivejustice and Lial7ilityfor Increasing Risks, 3 7 U .C.L.A. L.
REv. 439 ( 1990) ( 'The ex ante rationale for not waiting for actual harm to occur is that the moral
quality of the agent's behavior turns on nothing that subsequent events can reveal.") Many com
mentators reject the claim. Stephen Perry, for example, argues convincingly that the idea that
risk is a harm suggests a commitment to an objective account of risk. He also suggests, however,
that the objective account of risk is less plausible than a subjective account, and accordingly sug
gests that risk should not be considered a harm in and of itself. Stephen Perry, Risk, Harm and

&sponsif7ility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 321 (David Owen ed., 1995) .
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doing, and someone who imposes a risk of harm has behaved equally
wrongfully whether or not his or her conduct results in actual injury.
Granted, an advocate of this way of looking at the duty to compensate in
tort is not, strictly speaking, required to think that to expose someone to
risk is to harm him. But a natural way to understand this suggestion is that
a person acts wrongly when subjecting another person to risk, among other
things, because to expose someone to risk is to harm him.3 1
The analogous point on the benefit side also receives some support.

There are, for example, "lost-chance " cases, in which courts have allowed
plaintiffs to recover for the loss of a chance of future benefit.32 Courts
maintain that damages in such cases are a function of the total amount of
damage from injury or death , multiplied by the percentage of the chance
lost.33 The lost-chance cases thus abandon the traditional causation require
ment that a plaintiffs injuries were more likely than not to have resulted
from the defendant's negligence. Instead, the plaintiff is compensated for
the chance that the defendant's behavior deprived her of a benefit.
For our purposes, it is not necessary to accept the legal trend toward
compensating for exposure to risk or for lost chance of benefit. For one
need not think defendants should have to compensate for exposure to risk in
order to accept the claim that an ex ante increased risk of harm is itself a
harm. Nor need one think that defendants should have to compensate for
depriving a plaintiff of a lost chance of benefit in order to think of an
increased chance of benefit as itself a benefit. No one, after all , thinks that
all harms, still less all lost benefits, should be compensable. But the legal
tren d toward compensating for risk or for lost chance of benefit does lend
support to the idea that exposure to risk is a harm, and similarly that an
increased chance of benefit is itself a benefit. Indeed, the law recognizes the
idea where compensation is not at issue as well. Statutes criminalizing
reckless driving irrespective of outcome, for example, reflect the intuition.
And we may accept i t in ordinary morality when we believe i t appropriate
to be angry with someone who has exposed us to an unjustified risk of
harm , o r who has needlessly deprived us of a chance of benefit, whether or
not actual damage resulted from the exposure or whether the actual benefit
was lost.

3 1 . As Ken Simons points out, Schroeder's position on this point is curious, for he thinks
the duty to pay should be triggered by risk-creation, but he does not think that plaintiffs should
recover unless they have suffered resultant injury. /d. at 467-68. See Kenneth Simons, Corrective
Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 1 3, 1 20-25 ( 1 990) . In a
response to Simons, Schroeder raises the question of whether risk of harm is itself a harm, but
declines to answer it. Christopher Schroeder, Corrective justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law,
38 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 43, 1 60 ( 1 990) .
32. See Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 ( 1 996) (damage from
lost chance of recovery allowed to reach jury if plaintiff can show lost chance resulted from
defendant's negligence, even where chance of recovery would have been substantially less than
50% in the absence of defendant's negligence) .
33. /d. at 480.
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VI. THE EX POST ACCOUNT
If we think of an ex ante increased chance of benefit as itself a benefit,
threats can be assimilated to sure assurances . .For the agent who must
execute a failed threat can say to herself that the benefit she was seeking by
issuing the threat was the increased chance of deterrence, and that she has
received. At the point of execution , the agent should apply precisely the
deliberative principle we saw with assurances: She should weigh the benefit
of the ex ante increased chance of deterrence against the cost of making
good on the failed threat, and if the balance of benefit over cost is favorable,
the plan she adopted is optimal , and she should proceed to act as it
requires. Recall that in the case of a sure assurance, we measured the
benefit already gained-the advantage Clarence received from having
Doreen 's help plowing his field-against the cost of future perform
ance-the inconvenience of helping Doreen plow her field. So in the case
of a failed threat, we should weigh the benefit already gained-the ex ante
increased chance of deterring B-against the cost of future perform
ance-the cost of making good on the threat to tell Burt's spouse of the
affair. As in the ca�e of sure assurances, the threats that are rational to
execute, and hence the threats that are rational to issue, are those for which
the ex ante benefits outweigh the costs of threat-execution.
On this way of looking at the matter, we can express the rationality of
issuing a deterrent threat as follows:

[ ( 1 - PJ u ()'' ) - (1 - Px• ) u(y' ) ] > C.
( 1 - Px) u (y' ) is the probability, given that I issue a threat to x, that you will be
deterred from doing the undesired action, y. It is thus the expected benefit
from issuing the deterrent threat. ( 1 - Px ' ) u (y' ) is the probability that you
will not perform the undesired action, y, given that I choose to do something
other than threaten x. It is thus my expected benefit from adopting any
course of action other than threatening x, namely x' . Cis the absolute cost of
making good on the deterrent threat should it fail to deter. The left-hand
side of the inequality represents the expected benefit to the agent of issuing a
deterrent threat, and the right-hand side represents the cost of having to
carry through with the threat should it fail to deter. The cost, in turn, can be
expressed as u (yx' ) - u (yx) , which is the (dis) utility of foregoing another
course of action other than making good on the deterrent threat, minus the
(dis) utility of having to make good on the deterrent threat by performing x.
The left-hand side of the inequality reduces to:

and so the entire inequality is:

(Px ' - Px) u (y ' ) > u ( yx' ) - U()'X) .
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Compare this result with the

ex ante solution. Recall that the problem we

noted with that account was that it treats threat-execution as though it were
automatic. It thus fails to accommodate the two-tier deliberative principle
Gauthier advances in the case of assurances. Instead of determining when
it is rational to execute a deterrent threat by considering when it is rational
to issue such a threat in an up-front,

ex ante decision, the account proposed

here determines the rationality of issuing a deterrent threat by considering
when the plan of issuing and if need be executing a deterrent threat would
be rational to adopt, and then uses this as a criterion for determining when
it would be rational to make good on such a threat

ex post. Just as in the case

of sure assurances, it would arguably be rational to make good on a deter
rent threat when the expected benefits of having issued such a threat
exceed the absolute cost of having to make good on it. For want of a better
name, let us call this the ex post account of deterrent threats, by contrast with
Gauthier's

ex ante account.
ex ante account was expressed as:

Recall that the

[Px'u(yx') + (1

Px') u(y' ) ] > 0.

We can rewrite Gauthier's inequality by leaving only terms that contain

u(y')

on the left and moving all other terms to the right:

and then simplifying the left-hand side to produce:

Compare this to our inequality, which was:

[ (Px' - Px) u(y' ) ] > [ u(yx ' ) - u(yx) ] ,

ex ante and the ex post accounts should be
ex post account is exactly the same as the ex ante account on the

and the difference between the
clear. The

left-hand side of the inequality, which is a measure of the benefit of the
deterrent threat ex ante. The solutions, however, differ on the cost side. The
ex ante solution discounts the cost by the probability that it will not turn out
to be necessary to execute the deterrent threat. The ex post solution, by
contrast, does not discount the costs, and thus it measures the costs associ
ated with issuing deterrent threats from the standpoint of someone decid
ing what to do once his threat has already failed. In this way, the

ex post

account accommodates deliberative threat-execution, as it provides an an
swer to the question of when threat-execution itself is deliberatively ra
tional, and recommends the issuance of only those threats that satisfy this
condition.
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What are the consequences of this difference? The

ex ante account, which

discounts both benefit and cost, would serve to vindicate the rationality of
many more deterrent threats than would the

ex post account, because the
ex post account

right-hand side of the inequality will always be larger in the
than it is in the

ex ante account.34 The ex post account would vindicate the

rationality of only a small number of deterrent threats. This is as one might
expect, given that the

ex post account does not allow us to justify threat-issu

ance and threat-execution in a single, up-front choice. It justifies fewer
threats because it imposes an additional condition, namely that threats
must be deliberatively executed.
We can see the difference between the

ex ante and the ex post accounts if

we return to one of our earlier examples and assign some values to the
various options. Recall that Abigail wants to deter Burt from applying for a
job that Abigail hopes to obtain, and thus threatens to tell Burt's spouse that
Burt is having an affair. Let us suppose that deterring Burt from applying
for the job is worth roughly

$1,000 to Abigail (that is, she would pay that

sum of money to be sure of deterring Burt from applying). And suppose it
will cost Abigail roughly

$300 if she must make good on the threat to tell

Burt's wife of his affair (say, she would pay that sum of money to avoid

0.8 chance that
0.2
chance that he will fail to apply for it if left to his own devices), and a 0.4

having to disclose the affair). Suppose further that there is a

Burt will apply for the job if Abigail does not issue the threat (or a

chance that he will be dissuaded from applying for the job if Abigail does
issue the threat (or a

0.6 chance that he will still apply for the job, even in
ex ante account would suggest it is rational

the face of the threat). Then the

to issue the threat if the following inequality holds:

[ (.8 - . 6) 1,000] > [ . 8 (0) - .6 (- 300) ] .
So we have:

200 > 180.
ex ante per
ex post account, the

The benefits of issuing the threat outweigh its costs from an
spective, and the threat is rational to issue. On the

left-hand side of the inequality will stay the same, but the right-hand side
will not be discounted by the probabilities. The

ex post account would

accordingly suggest that it is rational to issue the threat if the following
inequality holds:

200 > 300,
which it does not. Thus, on the

ex post account the threat would not be

rational to issue.
34. This can be shown using the fact that u(yx' ) is a cost or disutility, and so should be
represented by a number less than or equal to zero.
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The fact that many fewer threats will be rational to issue on the ex post
than on the ex ante account is an advantage of the former account, as it
tracks our intuition that it is rational to follow through on, and hence to
issue , only those threats where the benefits far outweigh the costs. For
example , it would provide an explanation of the sense many have that
issuing credible nuclear retaliatory threats is not rational: The costs on the
right-hand side are so high that the expected gains from issuing such a
threat are unlikely to be sufficiently great to make the course of conduct
worthwhile.
The ex post solution applies the same reasoning to determine the ration
ality of issuing assurances, including risky assurances, that it uses for threats.
The difference between a risky assurance and a threat, on the one hand,
versus a sure assurance, on the other, would simply be that the left-hand side
of the inequality would not discount by probabilities where sure assurances
are concerned-that is, the benefit received would not have to be reduced
by the chances of its nonoccurrence. But this does not affect the structure
of the account: An assurance, whether risky or sure , is rational to issue if the
benefits from issuing it are greater than the costs associated with making
good on the assurance. When this condition is satisfied, it is rational to
make good on an assurance rationally issued, whether the benefit received
was only an increased chance of benefit or an actual, resultant benefit.
The asymmetry between threats and sure assurances, then, is not a deep
one, and it does not justify the divergent solutions Gauthier proposed in his
article Ass ure and Threaten. The appearance of asymmetry between the two
stems from the fact that, as in the case of risky assuran ces, the benefit side
of the inequality where threats are concerned is a discounted measure. This
suggests that it will be harder to vindicate the rationality of threat-execution,
and consequently harder to vindicate the rationality of issuing a deterrent
threat, than it will be to vindicate the rationality of a comparable sure
assurance. But this is only a matter of application. It does not reflect an
asymmetry at the level of the basic structure of the rationality of assurances
and threats.

VI I . J USTI FICATION REVISITED
We are finally in a position to return to the question of the justifiability of
deterrent threats. In particular, I wish to consider what an ex post account of
the justifiability of deterrent threats would look like , developing the parallel
between the rationality and the morality of such threats. The moral equiva
lent of the ex post account would hold that a deterrent threat is justifiable
when the expected moral benefits of issuing the threat are sufficient to
outweigh the absolute moral cost of having to make good on the threat
should it fail to deter. Thus, the justifiability of a police officer's use of
deadly force against a fleeing felon would depend on whether the benefit
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of deterring the suspect, discounted by the ex ante chance that he will fail
to be deterred, is a sufficient moral benefit to overcome the independent
wrongfulness of using deadly force against the suspect. Just as the rationality
of deterrent threats was determined in the ex post account according to the
balance of costs and benefits considered from the standpoint of someone
who must make good on a threat already issued, so the morality of deterrent
threats should be determined by the balance of moral costs and benefits
determined from the ex post standpoint as well. In weighing moral costs and
benefits, we should not discount the moral costs of having to make good on
a threat by the probability that it will not be necessary to execute the threat
after all. The act of violence performed in execution of the threat must itself
be morally justifiable, not on independent moral grounds, but as a "price"
paid for the ex ante moral benefit of potentially deterring the wrongful
conduct in question.
Several features of the police practice admit of ready explanation under
an ex post moral account. First, the more dangerous the suspect is believed
to be, the more beneficial a given chance of deterring him would be, and
thus the more justified the issuance of the deterrent threat against him. The
modern constitutional requirement of dangerousness might be thought of
as a bright-line rule that captures this intuition. According to the account
provided here, however, for the use of deadly force to be justified against
suspects on preventive grounds, the chances of deterring them from flight
would have to be significant, and any such threat would be extremely
difficult to justify if the officer thought it likely that the use of force under
the circumstances was likely to result in death .
Second, we would have at least a partial explanation for the sense that
putting a suspect on notice of the impending harm helps to justify it.
Notice is essential for establishing the increased ex ante chance of deter
rence from the issuance of the threat. On an ex post account, the chances
of deterring the wrongful act must be significant for a deterrent threat
to be justified. The more effective the threat the more easily justified it
is, for the expected benefits would increase with the likelihood of deter
rent success. There is an irony to this feature of the account, for pre
sumably a person can increase the chances of deterrent success simply
by increasing the severity of the harm threatened. And this makes it look
as though the more severe the harm threatened, the more justified the
threat.35 But recall that the severity of the threatened harm will also figure
in the cost side of the account, and indeed will figure there more heavily
than it will on the benefit side, because it will not be discounted by the
probability of deterrent success. Hence, the easiest threat to justify will
be one that involves little harm should it fail to deter but whose chances
of deterrent success are nevertheless high. This seems an intuitively plau
sible result.
35. I am grateful to Daniel Rodriguez for this suggestion.
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Finally, the account I have offered suggests more palatable conclusions
about a range of possible practices than the Extreme Account was able to
provide. For the proposed account places limits on both the rationality and
the morality of deterrent threats in a way that the Extreme Account did not:
The act must follow from a plan in which the balance of moral benefit over
moral burden is favorable. This requirement limits the acts it is possible to
justify by bootstrapping ourselves up from the justifiability of issuing deter
rent threats. We thus have a basis for distinguishing the police practice of
threatening and sometimes using deadly force against fleeing felons from
threatening to machine-gun trespassers on the courthouse lawn, along with
actually machine-gunning them should the deterrent threat fail. In the
latter case, it is plausible to suppose that although the

ex ante chances of
ex ante

deterring the wrongful trespassing may be relatively high, the overall

moral benefit is not great. And this is because the wrongful act whose
deterrence is sought-relatively harmless trespassing-is not sufficiently
damaging to make deterrence a great moral benefit. Conversely, the harm
required should the deterrent threat fail is grave: Using deadly force against
individuals who pose little likelihood of harm to society is a great moral
wrong, one whose infliction could only be justified in the face of a wrongful
act of substantial magnitude.
What the solution to the rationality of deterrent threats provides, by way
of analogy, is not a complete answer to the question of when practices
involving the use of deterrent threats are justifiable, but rather a framework
for thinking about practices in which we cannot offer an independent
justification for the acts of violence they involve. This framework, however,
leaves much unresolved, perhaps so much that it will seem of little value,
since it is unable to provide the kind of practical guidance that, for example,
the parallel account of the rationality of deterrent threats is able to provide.
While it is clear how to determine costs and benefits where the rationality
of deterrent threats is concerned, quantifying

moral costs and benefits

seems a hopeless task.
I cannot hope to solve this problem, for unlike where rational payoffs are
concerned, moral "payoffs" could never admit of any great precision. For
this reason, an

ex ante moral account can only provide a rough and ready

way of thinking about the moral aspects of a course of action involving
threats. But even if taken in this spirit, we still should be able to say
something about what would

count as a moral cost or benefit. This will

depend on what moral theory we use to assess plans involving the issuance
of deterrent threats. Let me then in closing return to the outstanding
question of what theory of morality could do the work in vindicating the
morality of deterrent threats that the pragmatic theory of rationality did in
vindicating their rationality.
One idea would exploit the parallel between the rational and the moral
dimensions of deterrent threats. The existence of the parallel may suggest
that the correct moral theory by which to evaluate the moral costs and

•
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benefits is itself a theory that has rationality at its core. I wish to illustrate
the idea I have in mind by considering briefly a further example of a
preemptive practice from outside the criminal law: the use of penalty
clauses in contracts.
Suppose you and I are negotiating a con tract for you to paint my living
room walls. And suppose it is not terribly important to me to paint my living
room now, as opposed to next year, but it is terribly important to me if i
undertake the project now that i t b e completed b y next Thursday. You are
a painter who is planning on going out of business next year, and it is
important to you to obtain the contract for work

now. It is not important to

you, however, that the project be .finished by next Thursday. To induce me
to paint my living room now, you offer me a contract in which you will paint
my living room for

$300 by next Thursday, with a promise to pay me $300

for every day's delay thereafter.
A court might refuse to enforce the delay provision if it suspects it
constitutes a penalty for breach rather than a liquidated damages clause.36
The explanation for the rule against penalty clauses is that the harm they
inflict on the party in breach is disproportionate to the losses the victim of
breach sustains. Courts, in short, are bothered by the fact that there is no
independent justification for forcing the party in breach to make a payment
so in excess of actual damages. But the ability to include a threat of
substantial harm in a contract may be highly advantageous for both parties,
for it may make possible a mutually beneficial agreement that would not be
available in the absence of such a threat. It may be advantageous to both of
us to enter into the contract to paint my living room, but this mutual
advantage can only be realized if I can receive adequate assurance that you
do not intend to delay. In the context of a freely negotiated contract, the
fact that it would be to the advantage of both parties, and hence

rational for

both parties to incorporate such a clause, should provide an adequate
justification for enforcing such clauses, as long as no third party is thereby
harmed. If both parties to the contract would be better off, and no one
would be worse off, there is no reason that threats to induce future perform
ance should not be enforceable. 37
One possible way of justifying preemptive practices would parallel the
above justification for allowing the use of penalty clauses in contracts. The
harm inflicted in each case cannot be justified on independent grounds.
But it may be justified on the grounds that there are advantages to allowing
agents to make use of deterrent threats in their dealings with one another.
Perhaps, then, preemptive practices can be justified as penalty clauses writ
large: They are morally defensible because they provide gains that those
affected by them can regard

ex ante as beneficial given their individual

36. E. Allan Farnsworth, FARNSWORTH IN CoNTRACTS § 1 2 . 1 8 ( 1 990) .
37. Some contract scholars support the use of penalty clauses within certain bounds. See
Melvin Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 2 1 1 ( 1 995) .

338

CLAIRE FIN KELSTEI N

concerns. A practice involving the issuance and execution o f deterrent
threats may thus be mutually beneficial for the members of a society who
must be governed by it.
We cannot think of the fleeing felon rule as the product of a rational
agreement for mutual benefit between police officer and fleeing suspect.
But considering the matter more broadly, it seems plausible to suppose that
members of a society interested in protecting individual liberty while pro
viding themselves with security from wrongful violence would regard cer
tain rules for evaluating the culpability of those suspected of such violence
as advantageous. In particular, rational agents might regard themselves as
benefitted by a rule for the arrest of subjects that leaves the decision of
whether to be exposed to violence in a certain sense up to the suspect:
Because the officer must issue a threat prior to using force, the suspect is
on notice of the consequences of flight. He can therefore choose to avoid
those consequences if he wishes by conforming to the officer's order.
This suggests that the correct moral principle for the evaluation of the
preemptive practices may be a principle of agreement, rather than some
independent principle of justice. One must treat this conclusion gingerly,
however. For the peculiar logic of the preemptive practices does not appear
to generalize to other institutions, institutions that for the most part are
guided by such independent principles. Independent preventive principles,
for example, appear to govern a practice like self-defense. And inde
pendent retributive principles seem most essential to our punitive practices.
Indeed, the anomalous nature of the preemptive practices might give us
pause: Is mutual advantage sufficient justification for a practice involving
acts of violence that cannot be independently morally justified after all?

